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DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND: OFF-ROAD VEHICLE USE ON NATIONAL 
SEASHORES 
 
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 
 
Kurt Peterson1 
ABSTRACT  
 
 
The National Park System is compromised of hundreds of parks, monuments, preserves, and 
other lands that are administered by the National Park Service.  Included in this National Park 
System are ten “national seashores.”  These national seashores are ripe for many recreational 
activities, such as fishing, camping, and “off-road vehicles.”  The use of off-road vehicles is a 
common practice on many of these national seashores, and it has resulted in a contentious debate 
about the appropriateness of off-road vehicles on national seashores.  This comment examines 
the tension between the dual-purposes of the National Park Service and the sanctioning of off-
road vehicle access on national seashores.  Additionally, this comment examines the legal 
disputes that have taken place involving off-road vehicle use on Cape Cod National Seashore and 
on Cape Hatteras National Seashore. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF ORV ACCESS ON NATIONAL SEASHORES 
A.  The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 
B.  The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
C.  Executive Orders Concerning Use of ORV’s on Public Lands 
D.  The Endangered Species Act of 1973 
III. ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL SEASHORES OF THE UNITED STATES 
                                                   
1 J.D. Candidate, Class of 2018, University of Maine School of Law; B.A., 2014, University of 
Maine. 
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When we look up and down the ocean fronts of America, we find that everywhere 
they are passing behind the fences of private ownership. The people can no longer 
get to the ocean. When we have reached the point that a nation of 125 million 
people cannot set foot upon the thousands of miles of beaches that border the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, except by permission of those who monopolize the 
ocean front, then I say it is the prerogative and the duty of the Federal and State 
Governments to step in and acquire, not a swimming beach here and there, but 
solid blocks of ocean front hundred of miles in length. Call this ocean front a 
national park, or a national seashore, or a state park or anything you please—I say 
the people have a right to a fair share of it.2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
                                                   
2 DYAN ZASLOWSKY & T.H. WATKINS, THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, THESE AMERICAN LANDS 33-
34 (, 1994) (quoting Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Department of Interior) (emphasis added). 
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 As long as you let some air out of your tires, you can drive just about any all wheel drive 
vehicle on the beach.  This recreational activity is known as “oversand” or “off-road vehicle 
driving” (“ORV”).  ORV is a truly unique and enjoyable experience, not only for the sheer 
aspect of being able to drive on miles of unspoiled beachfront, but also because it allows people 
access to otherwise inaccessible areas of shoreline.  With that said, there is well founded 
evidence that ORV access on coastal beaches results in adverse environmental and ecological 
impacts.  This discord makes ORV access on national seashores a ripe topic for examining the 
mutually exclusive purposes of the National Park Service (“NPS”). 
 In 1916, the United States Congress passed legislation that created a bureau within the 
Department of Interior called the NPS.3  Congress entrusted the NPS with a two-pronged 
purpose: “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein 
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave 
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”4  These twin purposes—conservation 
and enjoyment—are often unable to see eye to eye with one another.  When it comes to ORV 
access on the beaches and coastlines of national seashores, they are plainly incompatible. 
 This Comment will examine the tension between the NPS’s two-part function in the 
context of ORV access on national seashores.  Part II of this Comment will provide an overview 
of the relevant legal frameworks that are implicated by ORV access on national seashores.  Part 
III explores the creation of the ten national seashores in the United States.  Part IV analyzes the 
                                                   
3  Organic Act of 1916, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535 (codified as amended at 54 U.S.C. § 100101 
(2012)). 
4 Id. (emphasis added). 
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legal battles that have occurred over the use of ORV’s on national seashores, and Part V will 
offer some conclusions and predictions for the future of ORV use on national seashores. 
II.  THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF ORV ACCESS ON NATIONAL SEASHORES 
 
 Well before the NPS was established, Yellowstone National Park became the first 
national park in the United States and acted as the mainspring for a national park movement.5  It 
was not until 1916 when Congress created the NPS and tasked the service with its dual-purpose 
of conservation and enjoyment. 
A.  The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 
 The statutory framework for the NPS is currently codified under Title 54 of the United 
States Code, after Congress overhauled the original codification under Title 16, Chapter 1.6  The 
overhaul was consistent with its original policy and purposes of the NPS, but it amended and 
revised certain ambiguities, contradictions, and other imperfections that existed in the original 
enactment.7  Along with the two-pronged purpose, the NPS’s framework addresses a widerange 
of authority and duties.  Additionally, the framework identifies the areas which encompass the 
NPS, which are known as “System units.”8  These System units fall under the administrative 
                                                   
5 History, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/history.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LEG4-D6AN]. 
6 Act of Dec. 19, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-287, 128 Stat. 3094 (2014). 
7 Id. 
8 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (“The System shall include any area of land and water administered by the 
Secretary, acting through the Director, for park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or 
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jurisdiction of the NPS.9  Perhaps the most significant portion of the NPS Organic Act is the 
delegation of rulemaking authority.10 
 Although the original codification of the NPS Organic Act under Title 16 was 
overhauled, there still exist some sections under the original Title 16 codification that are of great 
importance.  The remaining codification under Title 16 is composed of the enabling legislation 
for the nearly four-hundred National Park System units.11  These System units are designated 
with a specific classification, such as a: national park, national monument, national military park, 
recreation area, conservation area, national lakeshore, or national seashore, to name a few.12  
                                                   
other purposes.”); see also id. at § 100102(6) (defining “National Park System” as “the areas of 
land and water described in section 100501.”). 
9 Id  § 100501; see also id.  § 102701(a)(1) (providing for the use of park rangers and other 
officers or employees of the Department of Interior to “maintain law and order and protect 
individuals and property within System units.”); See Daingerfield Island Protective Soc’y v. 
Babbitt, 823 F.Supp 950, 955 (D.D.C. 1993) (System units are “clearly covered by the Organic 
Act and thus is within the administrative jurisdiction of the NPS. . . . Congress clearly intended 
the Secretary of the Interior (‘Secretary’) to have an affirmative duty ‘to take whatever actions 
and seek whatever relief as will safeguard the units of the National Park System.”). 
10 Id.  § 100751(a) (“The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as the Secretary considers 
necessary or proper for the use and management of System units.”). 
11 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-23 (2016). 
12 Id. 
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Each of these classifications are each established differently and, depending on the classification 
of the unit, are conveyed different legal obligations.13 
B.  The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
 In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), which 
requires an environmental review of any major action by the federal government which 
significantly affects the quality of the human environment.14  NEPA’s process for reviewing the 
environmental impacts of federal government action is, in theory, quite simple, but in practice it 
is extremely complex and, as articulated in Part IV of this article, can be a litigation breeder.   
The NEPA process begins with an initial determination of whether the federal 
government action would have any effect on the environment; if it is determined that there would 
be no effect, then the action is categorically excluded from the NEPA process.15  If an action is 
not categorically excluded from the NEPA process, then an environmental assessment (“EA”) 
                                                   
13 See generally Garett R. Rose, “Reservations of Like Character”--The Origins and Benefits of 
the National Park System’s Classification Hierarchy, 121 Penn. St. L. Rev. 355 (2016) 
(discussing the NPS’s classification hierarchy). 
14 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2016). 
15 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2016) (“In determining whether to prepare an environmental impact 
statement the Federal agency shall: (a) Determine under its procedures . . . whether the proposal 
is one which: (1) Normally does not require an environmental impact statement, or (2) Normally 
does not require an environmental impact statement or an environmental assessment (categorical 
exclusion).”). 
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must be performed.16  Put simply, an EA is a concise public report that determines whether the 
federal action is significant enough to require an environmental impact statement (“EIS”).17  If 
there is not a finding of no significant impact, then the NPS begins a process of “scoping” the 
required EIS.18  Next, a draft environmental impact statement (“DEIS”) is prepared, which 
discusses the environmental consequences and provides the public with an opportunity for 
comment.19  Following the comment period of the DEIS, a final environmental impact statement 
(“FEIS”) is prepared, and another comment period ensues.20   
Although NEPA requires certain procedures to be employed when performing an EIS, 
NEPA does not dictate the substantive results and production of an EIS.21  In sum, NEPA is a 
                                                   
16 Id.  § 1501.4(b). 
17 Id.  § 1508.9 (if it is determined that there is no need to conduct an EIS, then they declare a 
“finding of no significant impact”).  
18 Id.  § 1501.7 (defining scoping as “the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be 
considered” in an EIS). 
19 Id.  § 1502.15-1502.16. 
20 Id  § 1503.4. 
21 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) (“When the Government conducts 
an activity, ‘NEPA itself does not mandate particular results.’ Instead, NEPA imposes only 
procedural requirements to ensure that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, 
and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.”) 
(quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)) ); Dept. of 
Transp. v. Pub Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004) (“At the heart of NEPA is a requirement that 
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procedural law that establishes a comprehensive policy for the protection and enhancement of 
the human environment.  NEPA organized the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), 
which is delegated the authority to promulgate regulations for the effective implementation of 
NEPA,22 and to discharge the three levels of environmental review: (1) categorical exclusions; 
(2) environmental assessments, and; (3) environmental impact statements.   
C.  Executive Orders Concerning Use of ORV on Public Lands 
 In furtherance of NEPA’s policy, and to address the increasing damage to federal public 
lands by ORV use, President Richard Nixon issued Executive Order 11644.23  The Executive 
                                                   
federal agencies ‘include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and 
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a 
detailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed 
action, (ii) any adverse environmental affects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-
term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would 
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.’”). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 4342. 
23 Exec. Order No. 11644, 37 C.F.R.  2877 (Feb. 8, 1972) (“It is the purpose of this order to 
establish policies and provide for procedures that will ensure that the use of off-road vehicles on 
public lands will be controlled and directed so as to protect the resources of those lands, to 
promote the safety of all users of those lands, and to minimize conflicts among the various uses 
of those lands.”). 
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Order required federal agencies to establish regulations and policies that would limit ORV use on 
public lands only to certain designated routes or areas.24  Furthermore, the Executive Order 
required federal agencies to monitor the effects of ORV use and to amend or rescind the 
designated routes or areas as necessary.25  In 1977, President Jimmy Carter amended Executive 
Order 11644, bolstering it considerably by providing for the closing of any route or area to ORV 
access if it is found that such use “will cause or is causing considerable adverse effects on the 
soil, vegetation, wildlife, wildlife habitat or cultural or historic resources of particular areas or 
trails of the public lands, . . .”26 
D.  The Endangered Species Act of 1973 
 In 1973, the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) was enacted to provide for the 
conservation, protection, and propagation of endangered and threatened species.27  Additionally, 
the law directed all Federal agencies and departments to utilize their authority and cooperate with 
                                                   
24 Id. § 3 (“Each respective agency head shall develop and issue regulations and administrative 
instructions . . . to provide for administrative designation of the specific areas and trails on public 
lands on which the use of off-road vehicles may be permitted, and set a date by which such 
designation of such areas and trails will be based upon the protection of the resources of the 
public lands, promotion of the safety of all users of those lands, and minimization of conflicts 
among the various uses of those lands.”). 
25 Id.  § 8; see also Utah Shared Access All., v. Carpenter, 463 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2006). 
26 Exec. Order 11989, 42 C.F.R. 26959, at § 2 (May 24, 1977). 
27 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2016). 
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State and local agencies in order to further the purposes of the ESA.28  In order to protect 
endangered and threatened species, section 9 of the ESA makes it unlawful for any person to 
“take” any species that is listed as endangered under section 4.29  Section 7 of the ESA imposes a 
responsibility on federal agencies to insure the protection of species that are listed as endangered 
or threatened before taking any action “authorized, funded or carried out by such agency.”30  In a 
similar fashion to NEPA’s process involving EA and EIS, the ESA requires a “Biological 
Assessment” be performed if a species listed as endangered or threatened is present.31  In sum, 
the ESA mandates a listing procedure for endangered and threatened species, prohibits the taking 
of listed species, and provides for agency consultation, among other objectives.  It is quite clear 
why this legislation has an impact on ORV access, given the danger that motor vehicles pose to 
species that live and nest on the shoreline.  
III.  ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL SEASHORES OF THE UNITED STATES 
 Every national seashore is founded by an enabling statute, which formally establishes the 
area as a national seashore, and addresses the manner of acquiring, administering, and the 
purposes for the national seashore’s creation.  In total, there are ten national seashores in the 
United States, six of which will be examined in this Comment.  The rationale for not fully 
addressing the other four national seashores is simply because ORV access is not sanctioned at 
                                                   
28 Id.  § 1531(c). 
29 Id.  § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
30 Id.  § 1536(a)(2).  
31 Id.  § 1536(c). 
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those national seashores.32  It is important to note that, although the enabling legislation for these 
national seashores are very similar, their ORV regulations are often very distinct.  What follows 
is a discussion about the creation of the six national seashores that sanction the use of ORV’s. 
A.  Cape Hatteras National Seashore 
 Off the coast of North Carolina is a 200-mile-long chain of barrier islands, commonly 
known as the “Outer Banks.”  Within this chain of barrier islands is the Cape Hatteras National 
Seashore (“CAHA”), the first national seashore to ever be established in the United States.33  A 
hot-spot for tourist, people flock to CAHA to visit the unspoiled and undeveloped beaches,34 and 
                                                   
32 The four other national seashores are: Canaveral National Seashore, Cumberland Island 
National Seashores, Gulf Island National Seashore, and Point Reyes National Seashore. See 
generally, Kurt Repanshek, Park History: How the National Seashores Came to Be, National 
Parks Traveler (Nov. 27, 2007), http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2007/11/park-history-
how-national-seashores-came-be2174 [https://perma.cc/76W7-6WG7].  
33 Learn About the Park, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/caha/learn/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NY5L-JKXT].  
34 See Dr. Beach, 2016 Top Beaches http://drbeach.org/online/portfolio/3-ocracoke-lifeguarded-
beach-outer-banks-of-north-carolina-2/ [https://perma.cc/366G-JJKJ]; see also CBS News, 
America’s Best Beach? Expert Says in N.C. (June 8, 2007), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/americas-best-beach-expert-says-in-nc/ 
[https://perma.cc/8RNC-Y4X3].  
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other tourist-attractions like the first English settlement in America on Roanoke Island.35  CAHA 
is also visited for its unique geological features,36 which are some of the most dynamic 
landscapes inhabited by man, due to its exposure to extreme climatic conditions.37  Considering 
all of these recreational, historic, and other attractions, it is understandable why CAHA was the 
first national seashore to be established.  
Seventeen years after the NPS’s inception, the United States was embroiled in the Great 
Depression. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal policies included the expansion of the 
                                                   
35 David Stick, Roanoke Island, the Beginnings of English America, Preface (1983, The 
University of North Carolina Press) (The disappearance of this early settlement on Roanoke 
Island is one of the greatest unsolved mysteries of our time, giving Roanoke the haunting epithet: 
“The Lost Colony.”). 
36 For example, look no further than Jockey’s Ridge State Park, the tallest, natural and mountain-
like sand dune. See North Carolina State Parks, Jockey’s Ridge State Park 
https://www.ncparks.gov/jockeys-ridge-state-park [https://perma.cc/757Q-4TN8].  
37 See David Walbert, Graveyard of the Atlantic, 
http://soe.unc.edu/resources/technology/support/learn/index.php [https://perma.cc/3JCU-
VDNB]; see also OuterBanks.com, Hurricanes and Storms 
https://www.outerbanks.com/hurricanes-storms.html [https://perma.cc/M5JY-JFSK] (noting the 
vulnerabilities of the Outer Banks to hurricanes and storms). 
  243 
NPS.38  The expansion of the NPS induced the passage of CAHA’s enabling legislation on 
August 17, 1937, but the formation of CAHA was conditioned upon the acquisition of certain 
lands within the Outer Banks.39  Consequently, although CAHA was authorized in 1937, it was 
not effectively established until January 12, 1953, when the Secretary of the Department of the 
Interior approved an order conveying a total of 12,414 acres of land within the Outer Banks, 
officially representing the first ever national seashore.40 
CAHA’s enabling legislation discusses the balance of preservation and recreation by 
permanently reserving CAHA as a “primitive wilderness,” except for certain areas, which were 
deemed to be especially adaptable for recreation uses.41  
“Except for certain portions of the area, deemed to be especially adaptable for 
recreational uses, particularly swimming, boating, sailing, fishing, and other 
recreational activities of similar nature . . . the said area shall be permanently 
                                                   
38 The New Deal Years 1933-1941, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/anps/anps_3.htm [https://perma.cc/3R6Q-
URUH].  
39 16 U.S.C. § 459 (“When title to all lands . . . have been vested in the United States, said area 
shall be, and is, established, dedicated, and set apart as a national seashore recreational area for 
the benefit and enjoyment of the people and shall be known as the Cape Hatteras National 
Seashore Recreational Area . . . such lands shall be secured by the United States only by public 
of private donation.”). 
40 CAMERON BINKLEY, THE CREATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF CAPE HATTERAS NATIONAL 
SEASHORE 220-221 (2007), https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/caha/caha_ah.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H4P5-UMDK]. 
41 16 U.S.C. § 459a-2.  
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reserved as a primitive wilderness and no development of the project or plan for 
the convenience of visitors shall be undertaken which would be incompatible with 
the preservation of the unique flora and fauna or the physiographic conditions 
now prevailing in this area: . . .42 
 
The plain language of CAHA’s enabling statute treats the interest of preservation with greater 
priority than the interests associated with recreational activities and enjoyment.  The general rule 
is to favor preservation, while the exception is to favor recreation.   
The regulations pertaining to the use of ORV use are codified under 36 C.F.R. § 7.58, 
and cover a range of issues, including: hunting, fishing, and ORV.  The ORV regulations provide 
a requirement that an ORV permit “is required to operate a vehicle on designated ORV routes at 
the Seashore.”43  These ORV permits are referred to as a “form of NPS special park use 
permits,”44 which may be issued, without limitation as to the number of permits issues,45 as long 
as the activity will not “unduly interfere with normal park operations or cause derogation of the 
                                                   
42 Id. (emphasis added); see also Wilderness Society v. Norton, 2005 WL 3294006, 15 (United 
States District Court, District of Columbia) (dismissing counts 5 and 6 of the complaint after 
determining that no assessment of CAHA’s wilderness need be conducted under the 2001 NPS 
Management Policies because “Congress has already determine that [CAHA] is ‘reserved as a 
primitive wilderness,”). 
43 36 C.F.R. § 7.58(c)(2)(i). 
44 Id.  § 7.58(c)(2). 
 
45 Id.  § 7.58(c)(2)(iii). 
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park’s resources or values, or present a threat to public safety or property.”46  Individuals seeking 
an ORV permit must comply with the vehicle and equipment requirements, must take an 
educational ORV course, and may only use designated ORV routes.47  The Superintendent 
retains that ability to temporarily limit, restrict, or terminate access to ORV routes on the basis of 
public health and safety, ORVE management considerations, natural and cultural resource 
protection, species management strategy, and desired future conditions for species listed as 
threatened, endangered, and special status.48 
B.  Cape Cod National Seashore 
 On August 7, 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed an Act that authorized and 
established the Cape Cod National Seashore (“Cape Cod”), the second national seashore in the 
Untied States.49  After the signing, President Kennedy reflected his desire that it “be one of a 
whole series of great seashore parks which will be for the use and benefit of all our people . . . to 
acquire and preserve the natural and historic values of a portion of Cape Cod[] . . . .”50  Cape Cod 
                                                   
46 Permits & Special Park Use, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/colo/special-use-
permits.htm [https://perma.cc/W65U-TCBS] (defining “special park use” as “a short-term 
activity benefitting an individual, group, or organization, rather than the general public”). 
47 36 C.F.R. § 7.58(c)(2)-(9) (2017). 
 
48 Id. § 7.58(10)(i)(A)-(E). 
 
49 16 U.S.C. § 459b(a)(b), (Pub. L. 87-126, § 1, Aug. 7, 1961, 75 Stat. 284). 
50 Remarks on Signing Bill Authorizing Cape Cod National Seashore, JOHN F. KENNEDY 
PRESIDENTIAL LIB. & AND MUSEUM (Aug. 7, 1961), https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-035-034.aspx [https://perma.cc/X53W-X3YG].  
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is located at the southeaster corner of Massachusetts and is made up of forty miles of pristine 
beaches and coastline.  Although Cape Cod may not have been the first enacted national 
seashore, it is certainly the first national seashore when it comes to tourism, as nearly 4.7 million 
people visited Cape Cod in 2016.51 
 Similar to Cape Hatteras National Seashore’s enabling legislation, Cape Cod’s enabling 
legislation discusses the balance of preservation and recreation and tilts the scales in favor of 
preservation: 
In order that the seashore shall be permanently preserved in its present state, no 
development or plan for the convenience of visitors shall be undertaken therein 
which would be incompatible with the preservation of the unique flora and fauna 
or the physiographic conditions now prevailing or with the preservation of such 
historic sites and structures as the Secretary may designate: . . . That the Secretary 
may provide for the public enjoyment and understanding of the unique natural, 
historic, and scientific features of Cape Cod within the seashore by establishing 
such trails, observation points, and exhibits and providing such services as he may 
deem desirable for such public enjoyment and understanding: . . . That the 
Secretary may develop for appropriate public uses such portions of the seashore 
as he deems especially adaptable for camping, swimming, boating, sailing, 
hunting, fishing, the appreciation of historic sites and structures and natural 
features of Cape Cod, and other activities of similar nature.52 
 
                                                   
51 Annual Park Recreation Visitation, NAT’L PARK SERV.,, 
https://irma.nps.gov/Stats/SSRSReports/Park%20Specific%20Reports/Annual%20Park%20Recr
eation%20Visitation%20(1904%20-%20Last%20Calendar%20Year)?Park=CACO 
[https://perma.cc/BK8Y-DNJ5] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
52 See 16 U.S.C. § 459b-6(1) (emphasis added); U.S. v. Knauer, 707 F.Supp.2d 379, 385-386 (D. 
N.Y., Apr. 20, 2010) (noting the importance of the linguistic differences between the words 
“shall” and “may” in national parks enabling legislations). 
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The regulations pertaining to Cape Cod National Seashore are enumerated under 36 
C.F.R. § 7.67 and, like CAHA, regulate activities such as hunting, fishing, and CAHA.53  The 
regulations provide for certain requirements to obtain an ORV (referred to as oversand vehicle in 
Cape Cod), enumerate specific ORV routes, and permits the Superintendent to close any route at 
any time “for weather, impassable conditions due to changing beach conditions, or to protect 
resources.”54  Cape Cod National Seashore’s regulatory framework is very similar to CAHA’s, 
but unlike CAHA, Cape Cod limits the amount of ORV permits that may be issued annually, 
currently the Superintendent will issue no more than 3,400 ORV permits annually.55 
C.  Padre Island National Seashore 
 Padre Island National Seashore (“Padre Island”) is the longest stretch of undeveloped 
barrier island in the world, protecting approximately seventy miles of South Texas’s coastline.56  
For over half a century, Padre Island was used almost exclusive for ranching, other uses of this 
land included: the exploitation of oil and natural gas reserves, a Navy bombing range, and 
                                                   
53 See generally Craft v. Hodel, 683 F.Supp. 289, 302 (. D Mass., Apr. 4, 1988) (holding that 
Cape Cod’s ban of public nudity under this regulatory section was not invalid because the 
enabling legislation did not explicitly authorize the regulation of nude bathing, and did not 
violate any constitutional rights). 
54 36 C.F.R. § 7.67(a)(1)(2) (2018). 
 
55 Id. § 7.67(a)(11)(i) (2018). 
 
56 Padre Island, NAT’L PARK SERV., available at https://www.nps.gov/pais/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/YRR3-PKEA].  
  248 
eventually a tourism industry.57  Unlike CAHA and Cape Cod, the enabling legislation for Padre 
Island does not emphasize preservation and conservation over recreation: on September 26, 
1962, Padre Island National Seashore was officially opened “[i]n order to save and preserve, for 
purposes of public recreation, benefit, and inspiration, a portion of the diminishing seashore of 
the United States remains undeveloped, . . .”58  Padre Island’s enabling legislation only carves 
out an exception by which the Secretary may perform conservation and preservation functions if 
it serves the primary purpose of Padre Island.59  Compare that exception, with CAHA and Cape 
Cod’s, where there is an exception to permit certain recreational activities in lieu of preserving of 
the area.  The regulations for Padre Island National Seashore are located under 36 C.F.R. § 7.75.  
Padre Island does not currently require an ORV special use permit, and ORV access is 
“permitted on all of the beach . . . except for the approximately 4 ½ miles of beach between the 
North and South Beach Access Roads.”60 
D.  Fire Island National Seashore 
                                                   
57 National Park Service, History & Culture,  
https://www.nps.gov/pais/learn/historyculture/index.htm [https://perma.cc/V65S-8W9A] (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
58 16 U.S.C. § 459d (emphasis added). 
59 16 U.S.C. § 459d-4 (“except that authority otherwise available to the Secretary for the 
conservation and management of natural resources may be utilized to the extent he finds such 
authority will further the purposes of sections 459d. . . .”). 
60 See 36 C.F.R. § 7.75(a)(1)-(2) (2018). 
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 Fire Island National Seashore (“Fire Island”) is a thirty-mile long barrier island located 
off of Long Island, New York, that was visited by approximately 431,303 people in 2016.61  A 
unique aspect of Fire Island National Seashore is the Sunken Forest Preserve, which is a 
“maritime forest” that is globally recognized as a “rare ecological community.”62  Fire Island 
National Seashore was established by Congress on September 11, 1964, for the “purpose of 
conserving and preserving for the use of future generations certain relatively unspoiled and 
undeveloped beaches, dunes, and other natural features . . . .”63  This enabling legislation, unlike 
the other national seashores, only considers the interests of preservation and conservation.64  
However, Fire Island National Seashore’s regulatory framework, codified under 36 C.F.R. § 
                                                   
61 Fire Island NS Annual Park Recreation Visitation, NAT’L PARK SERV.,   
https://irma.nps.gov/Stats/SSRSReports/Park%20Specific%20Reports/Annual%20Park%20Recr
eation%20Visitation%20(1904%20-%20Last%20Calendar%20Year)?Park=FIIS 
[https://perma.cc/3N8K-Q35P] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
62 National Park Service, Sunken Forest (last visited Apr. 22, 2017), available at 
https://www.nps.gov/fiis/planyourvisit/sunken-forest.htm [https://perma.cc/6WRA-CG6H]. 
63 16 U.S.C. § 459e(a) (2018). 
64 Id. at § 459e-6(a) (2018) (“The Secretary shall administer and protect the Fire Island National 
Seashore with the primary aim of conserving the natural resources located there. The area known 
as the Sunken Forest Preserve shall be preserved from bay to ocean in as nearly its present state 
as possible, without developing roads therein, but continuing the present access by those trails 
already existing and limiting new access to similar trails limited in number to those necessary to 
allow visitors to explore and appreciate this section of the seashore.”). 
  250 
7.20, provides for the use of ORV.65  ORV access is limited only to designated routes and to 
individuals who maintain the required ORV permit.66  However, obtaining an ORV permit on 
Fire Island is very restrictive; only certain eligible persons and groups may submit permit 
applications.67  Not only does Fire Island restrict ORV permits to those who meet specific 
eligibility requirements, but there is a limitation on the amount of permits that can be issued, and 
the seashore provides for alternative means of transportation for people to access the national 
seashore.68  This restrictive-approach is further recognizable from NPS’s webpage about ORV 
                                                   
65 36 C.F.R. § 7.20(a) (2005). 
 
66 Id. at § 7.20(a)(2)(4) (2005). 
 
67 Id. at § 7.20(a)(5)(i)-(vi) (2005) (“limiting eligibility to only persons who are year-round 
residents; persons who held part-time permits prior to January 1, 1978; persons, firms, 
partnerships, corporations, organizations, or agencies which provide services essential to public 
facilities and the occupancy of residences on the Island; persons who desire access by motor 
vehicle to Seashore lands in order to engage in fishing or hunting thereon, provided such access 
is compatible with conservation and preservation of Seashore resources; owners of estates in real 
property located on the Island who have a demonstrated need for temporary access to that 
property on days when there is no alternative transportation; holders of reserved rights of use and 
occupancy.”). 
68 Id. at § 7.20(a)(3) (2005) (“In providing for access to the island, the Superintendent shall 
require maximum possible reliance on those means of transportation which are other than private 
motor vehicles and which have the minimum feasible impact on Seashore lands”); see 
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on Fire Island: “Because there are 17 residential communities within the boundaries of the Fire 
Island National Seashore, limited driving is permitted by contractors, utilities, and a small 
number of residents to support the maintenance of these communities. Such permits are tightly 
restricted and regulated.”69 
E.  Assateague Island National Seashore 
 Assateague Island National Seashore (“Assateague Island”) is located on Maryland’s 
Eastern Shore, just south of Ocean City, Maryland.  With the NPS looking to expand this 
concept of a national seashore, Assateague Island had been in the agency’s sights for quite a 
while, and in 1965 the NPS published a promotional brochure describing Assateague “as the 
largest undeveloped seashore between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras.”70  Upon arriving to probe 
Assateague Island as a potential new national seashore, NPS found that ORV use was 
widespread and that many “local vehicle owners were members of the Assateague Beach Buggy 
Association . . . . Their primary purpose was to lobby for continued use and expanded beach 
                                                   
Christianson v. Hauptman, 991 F.2d 59, 63-64 (2nd Cir. 1993) (holding that the rescission and 
banning of seaplanes in Fire Island National Seashore was not arbitrary nor capricious). 
69 National Park Service, Oversand Vehicle Operation, Fire Island, (last visited NEED DATE),  
 
https://www.nps.gov/fiis/planyourvisit/oversand-vehicle-operation.htm [https://perma.cc/V8JF- 
 
P9BD].  
 
70 BARRY MACKINTOSH, ASSATEAGUE ISLAND NATIONAL SEASHORE AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
HISTORY 23 (1982), available at 
https://www.nps.gov/asis/learn/management/upload/asisadminhistory.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M6GG-JWHN].  
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access in the face of conservationist pressures to restrict or eliminate ORV’s.”71  The 
Superintendent of Assateague Island in the 1970’s maintained a dim outlook on the future of 
ORV use on Assateague, believing that they would eventually be completely banned.72  
Congress responded to the NPS’s promotion of Assateague Island by passing legislation 
that established and authorized the creation of Assateague Island National Seashore on 
September 21, 1965.73  The enabling legislation of Assateague Island National Seashore favors 
the interests of recreation use and enjoyment: “For the purpose of protecting and developing 
Assateague Island in the States of Maryland and Virginia and certain adjacent waters and small 
marsh islands for public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment, . . .”74  Further, the 
administration section of Assateague Island’s enabling legislation expresses that, except for 
national wildlife refuge lands and waters, “the Secretary shall administer the Assateague Island 
National Seashore for general purposes of public outdoor recreation, including conservation of 
natural features contributing to public enjoyment.”  The regulatory framework governing 
Assateague Island is situated under 36 C.F.R. § 7.65.  The regulations require individuals to 
                                                   
71 Id. at 119. 
72 Id. at 120 (“In brief, the staff here recognizes that beach vehicles are destined to be banned 
from the public beaches. The only question is when such activity will cease to be a pleasure and 
become a total nuisance. Each season the number and variety of beach vehicles increases and it 
is just a matter of time until the outcry against them becomes even stronger than the great 
political pressure exerted by them.”). 
73 16 U.S.C. § 459f (2018). 
74 Id. 
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obtain ORV permits and authorize ORV travel only to designated routes that not prohibited 
under the regulations or by the Superintendent.75 
F.  Cape Lookout National Seashore 
 On March 10, 1966, Congress established Cape Lookout National Seashore (“Cape 
Lookout), “[i]n order to preserve for public use and enjoyment an area in the State of North 
Carolina possessing outstanding natural and recreation values, there is hereby authorized to be 
established the Cape Lookout National Seashore, . . .”76  Although Cape Lookout is located 
immediately south of CAHA, separated only by an inlet, Cape Lookout’s enabling legislation 
diverges from CAHA’s enabling legislation by not designating Cape Lookout as a “primitive 
wilderness” and not expressing a preference for preservation and conservation.77  The enabling 
statute for Cape Lookout National Seashore additionally requires the Secretary to administer 
Cape Lookout “for the general purposes of public outdoor recreation, including conservation of 
natural features contributing to public enjoyment.”78  The regulations relating to Cape Lookout 
National Seashore are located under 36 C.F.R. § 7.67.  The regulations require ORV permits, and 
allow access to only designated routes, but unlike CAHA Cape Lookout limits the amount of 
ORV permits that can be issued in a given year.79 
                                                   
75 36 C.F.R. §7.65(b)(2)-(4) (2003). 
 
76 16 U.S.C. § 459g (1974). 
77 National Park Service, Annual Park Recreation Visitation Cape Lookout NS (Apr. 18, 2018)), 
https://perma.cc/EPJ8-BQP2 (In 2016 there were 458,000 visitors to Cape Lookout, compare this 
with Cape Hatteras’s over 2.4 million visitors in 2016). 
78 16 U.S.C. § 459g-4(a) (2005). 
79 36 C.F.R. § 7.67(a)(1)-(11) (2012). 
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IV.  LEGAL BATTLES RELATING TO ORV’S ON NATIONAL SEASHORES 
 When you take into account the divergent, yet equally impassioned positions among 
conservationists and recreationists in the context of ORV use, and the various legal and 
regulatory frameworks that are implicated by ORV access, it is rather surprising that there has 
been so little litigation on the issue of ORV access on national seashores.  The legal challenges to 
ORV use on national seashores are covered in this section.  Specifically highlighted are two 
battles: one challenging ORV access on Cape Code National Seashore, and another on CAHA. 
A.  Conservation Groups Take on ORV on Cape Cod 
 The first legal attack on ORV use on national seashores came out of Cape Cod National 
Seashore.  The lawsuit was launched in 1984 by three environmental organizations: 
Conservation Law Foundation (“CLF”); Audubon Society, and the Sierra Club.80  Although 
ORV access on Cape Cod was not initially a significant recreational practice by its visitors, it 
became increasingly common by 1978.81  This fast growing trend of driving on Cape Cod’s 
shorelin, along with a five-year study detailing the effects of such use by the University of 
                                                   
 
80 Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Clark, 590 F.Supp 1467 (D. Mass. 
1984). 
81 Id. at 1471 (“ORV’s were not a major recreational use of the Seashore when it was first 
established. By 1964, the first year ORV permits were issued . . . 964 vehicles were registered. 
Thereafter, interest skyrocketed and by 1978 the number of permits had jumped to almost 6,000. 
Between 1975 and 1978 ORV use doubled.”). 
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Massachusetts Amherst, motivated the NPS to review their ORV management policy and to 
implement an updated plan in 1981.82   
Unsatisfied with the NPS’s updated plan, CLF, Audubon Society, and Sierra Club filed 
suit.  The environmental-group plaintiff’s raised a number of issues in their complaint, alleging 
that the Management Plan violated the Cape Cod’s enabling legislation, the Organic Act of 1916, 
the Secretary of the Department of Interiors general public trust obligations, the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”), and NEPA.83  The relief sought was the performance of an EIS, and a 
permanent injunction barring all ORV use on Cape Cod National Seashore until the NPS adopted 
an ORV Management Plan that sufficiently protected the Seashore and did not interfere with the 
other recreational uses of the seashore.84  The Massachusetts court dealt swiftly with the 
procedural claims brought by plaintiffs under the APA,85 and turned to the more substantive 
                                                   
82 Id. (“The Plan, in capsule form, permits the following: use of ORV’s in unlimited numbers 
along a thirty-mile stretch of the Outer Beach except when seasonal high tides or tern nesting 
seasons prevent continuous beach travel (under such conditions ORV’s are allowed along a 
connecting six-mile inner dune trail); use of a half-mile cross-land trail by commercial dune taxis 
and dune cottage residents; and use by 100 self-contained ORV’s of two overnight sites on the 
beach; no limits on the daily or annual numbers of ORV’s.”). 
83 Id. at 1471-72. 
84 Id. at 1472. 
85 Id. at 1475-76 (finding “no grounds for relief in plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated the 
APA by failing to publish the Management Plan in the Federal Register” because of the fact that 
the plaintiff’s filed the present lawsuit on the date the Management Plan became effective, which 
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claims involving the alleged violation of Cape Cod’s enabling legislation, the Organic Act, and 
the ORV Executive Orders. 
Initially, the court looked at the enabling legislation to determine what restrictions and 
duties the Secretary was under while managing and administering Cape Cod National 
Seashore.86  The legislative history was emphasized by the court, as it shed light on the purpose 
behind the national seashore and touched on the constraint between conservation and 
enjoyment.87  Based on the plain language of the enabling legislation and its legislative history, 
                                                   
demonstrated that the plaintiff’s had actual notice; additionally concluding that the Secretary’s 
decision not to prepare an EIS was not arbitrary due to the expertise of the NPS in environmental 
matters and due to the fact that the NPS implemented a plan after a five-year study and analysis 
of the ecological effects of ORV use which was subject to public comment). 
86 Id. at 1478-79; 16 U.S.C. § 459b-6(1) (1961). 
87 See id. at 1479 (“The House Report goes on to elucidate this ‘primary purpose’: ‘[T]he major 
emphasis of the bill is, and the major emphasis of the National Park Service in administering the 
seashore must be, on conserving the values which now make Cape Cod so attractive to so many 
people and which are in such great danger of being lost—its scenery, its historical association, 
its reminders of an older and quieter way of life than most of us now enjoy, its wildlife and flora . 
. . . The committee . . . recommends strongly that the Secretary of the Interior use all powers at 
his command to prevent any such indiscriminate use of the seashore as might seriously 
depreciate the very values which it is being created to preserve.’” (citing H.R. Rep. No. 673, 87th 
Cong., Sess., reprinted in 1961 IV House Miscellaneous reports on Public Bills 118). 
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the court declared that the statute gave “primacy to preservation.”88  Thus, any use of the Cape 
Cod National Seashore “which would be incompatible with the preservation of the unique flora 
and fauna” at the time the seashore was created in 1961, was deemed to fall outside of the 
statutory power of the Secretary, and “any authorized recreational use must not only be 
ecologically ‘compatible’ but ‘appropriate’ in the light of these values the Act seeks to 
preserve.”89  Next, the court looked at the NPS Organic Act and, in similar fashion to Cape 
Cod’s enabling legislation, the Massachusetts court also interpreted the Organic Act to favor 
preservation and conservation over enjoyment and recreation.90  Lastly, the court found that the 
                                                   
88 Id. 
89 Id. (emphasis added). 
90 Id. (“The [Organic] Act thus emphasizes the preservation of park lands in their natural scenic, 
and historic condition . . . . Both [enabling legislation and the Organic Act] allow for a balancing 
of preservation and development only to the extent that such development does not derogate 
from the overriding preservation mandate.”); see also id. n. 7 (providing a helpful comparison 
between ORV and National Forest lands: “Thus the [enabling act and Organic Act] require a 
level of protection greater than that generally extended to National Forest lands under the 
“multiple use” concept of 16 U.S.C. §§ 528 et seq. (1960) . . . (national forests to be 
‘administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, wildlife, and fish purposes’), but less than 
that afforded to National Wilderness lands under 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131 et seq. (1974) (‘Wilderness 
Act’) (national wilderness lands to ‘be administered . . . in such a manner as will leave them 
unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness.’ The statute further provides that ‘there 
shall be . . . no use of motor vehicles’) . . . .”). 
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two ORV Executive Orders “add specificity to the preservation and appropriateness mandates” 
and that under the Executive Orders, the Secretary, “must prohibit any ORV use that adversely 
affects the natural, aesthetic or scenic values of the Seashore.”91  In sum, the court concluded that 
the enabling legislation, Organic Act, and the two Executive Orders “reflect[ed] an 
understanding that a particular recreational activity can be fully compatible with the preservation 
of the Seashore’s ecology but nonetheless be inappropriate as a public use.”92 
Needless to say, this was a major win for the conservation and environmental-group 
plaintiffs, as the court had clearly declared preferential treatment of the interests of preservation 
in lieu of the interests of recreation and enjoyment.  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
never interpreted the Organic Act and its conflicting mandates, so this interpretation is similarly 
of significant precedential value as the court’s interpretation provides conservationists with 
authority in prospective legal battles concerning the interpretation of other national seashores 
enabling legislation that have similar language.  
 Following the court’s interpretation of the applicable law, they moved on to address the 
remaining substantive legal claims brought by plaintiffs of whether the Management Plan 
violated the Cape Cod enabling legislation; the Organic Act, and; the Executive Orders.  The 
Management Plan that was implemented by the NPS on Cape Cod National Seashore relied 
predominantly on the University of Massachusetts at Amherst study on the effects of ORV’s on 
                                                   
91 Id. at 1480 (the court added that “in making such a determination, the Secretary must look not 
only at the ecological impacts of ORV’s but also their compatibility with other recreational uses 
and values for which the Seashore was created.”). 
92 Id. at 1484. 
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the ecology of the seashore.93  The Management Plan designated ORV zones and created routes 
for ORV travel on areas of Cape Cod National Seashore which were found to be the least 
ecologically vulnerable.94  The NPS established zones which either permitted or restricted ORV 
access by adhering to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst study.  Thus, the court held 
that the decision to adopt the plan was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion because 
the Secretary’s decision to adopt the Management Plan sufficiently complied “with the mandate 
of the [enabling legislation and Organic Act] to preserve the Seashore ecology . . . . [was] in 
accordance with . . . the requirement of Executive Orders . . . that such zones be established so as 
not to ‘adversely affect’ the Seashore’s ecology.”95  Lastly, the court considered whether the use 
of ORV’s on Cape Cod could be deemed an “appropriate public use” in conformity with the 
administration section of Cape Cod’s enabling legislation.96  On this question, the court found 
that because the Secretary only considered the preservation of the Seashore’s ecology and did not 
adequately consider whether ORV use constituted an appropriate public, the case was remanded 
for thorough consideration of whether ORV use would be an appropriate public use.97 
                                                   
93 Id (additionally, the court pointed out that this study was the first of its kind to examine the 
impacts of ORV use on the coast). 
94 Id. at 1481. 
95 Id; see also id. at 1484 (finding that implementation and enforcement of the plan was 
effectively protecting the ecology of the Seashore from the impacts of ORV use). 
96 16 U.S.C. § 459b-6. 
97 On remand, the court again affirmed their denial of injunctive relief and further stipulated that 
the then-current Management Plan should remain in full force and effect, “[g]iven the court’s 
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 1.  First Circuit Appeal and Some Insight from Justice Breyer 
 Following the Massachusetts District Court ruling, CLF filed an appeal to the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals, challenging the district court’s findings that ORV was “appropriate for 
public use” and that the Management Plan was protecting the ecology of Cape Cod National 
Seashore.98  The First Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision on both of those counts.99  A 
very intriguing aspect of the First Circuit affirming decision comes, not in the majority opinion, 
                                                   
finding that there is a rational basis in the record for defendants’ assertion that the Plan is 
adequately protecting the Seashore ecology, and in light of the substantial reliance of ORV users 
on the present regulations . . . .” Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Clark, 590 
F.Supp. 1481, 1489 (1984). 
98 Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Sec’y of Interior, 864 F.2d 954, 957 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
99 Id. at 959 (first on the challenge of appropriateness: “Given the Secretary’s careful treatment 
of the issue on remand and the considerable restrictions placed on ORV use under the 1985 Plan, 
we cannot say that the Secretary’s decision has no rational basis or represents an abuse of 
discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the district court in granting defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on the appropriateness issue under Section 7 of the [enabling legislation].”; second on 
the challenge of ecological damage: “Though some ecological damage to the Seashore may have 
occurred prior to adoption of the 1981 Plan, we believe sufficient evidence exists to support 
defendants’ conclusion that ORV use has caused no significant ecological damage at the 
Seashore since that time. We therefore affirm the district court on the issue of ecological 
protection under the 1981 and 1985 Plans.”). 
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but in the concurring judgment written by then First Circuit Judge, now Supreme Court Justice 
Stephen Breyer.  Justice Breyer agreed with the overall holding, but seemingly attempted to limit 
the holding to leave the door open for potentially more restrictive ORV regulation: 
I agree with the panel that, given the statute’s proviso, one may not reasonably 
read it as imposing an absolute ban on ORVs, particularly since many fishermen 
and campers like to use them. I also agree with the panel’s opinion; we cannot 
now say that the Interior Department regulations are “arbitrary, capricious” or an 
“abuse of discretion.” I add only that this latter question is quite a close one. The 
Conservation Law Foundation, in its brief, notes that recreational “vehicles are 
used by less than 2.5 percent of the summertime visitors to the Seashore.” The 
National Seashore beachfront miles, or 16 percent of the beach, for ORV use. 
Although it seems fairly obvious that those who use ORVs need a length of 
coastline in which to use them, it is also fairly obvious that their use is often 
incompatible with the quiet enjoyment of the seashore that the Cape Cod National 
Seashore Act contemplated the vast majority of visitors would seek. At some 
geographical point, reserving miles of coastline for ORVs would amount to taking 
too much from too many for the enjoyment of too few. We here hold that, giving 
full and appropriate weight to the judgment of the administrators, we cannot say, 
on the basis of the record before us, that 16 percent actually crosses the line 
marked by the statutory word “arbitrary.”100  
 
This passage by Justice Breyer is an interesting glimpse into the mind of a current 
Supreme Court Justice on the issue of ORV use on national seashores.  Although he 
declines to interpret Cape Cod’s enabling legislation as imposing an absolute ban on 
ORV’s, he takes a middle-ground position and reserves for future cases a point at which 
too much ORV access would infringe on the ability of others to enjoy the seashore.  
Justice Breyer seems to indicate a threshold point where reserving more than the amount 
                                                   
100 Id. at 961 (emphasis added). 
  262 
reserved in the present case—involving 16 percent of the seashore—may be considered 
by Justice Breyer as stepping over the agency’s discretion and the enabling legislation.101   
B.  The Legal Saga of ORV’s on Cape Hatteras  
 Cape Hatteras was largely undeveloped throughout the 1950’s; the lack of infrastructure, 
specifically roads, made accessing the area impracticable, but improved automotive technologies 
led residents and visitors of CAHA to begin accessing the beach using motor vehicles.102  On 
August 30, 1961, the NPS issued a press release discussing its support for legislation that would 
allow the agency to assist the State of North Carolina to build a bridge across the Oregon Inlet, 
which would reduce the overcrowding of the sole ferry boat that transported vehicles to 
CAHA.103  There was some pushback to the building of the bridge, believing that its construction 
would run afoul CAHA’s enabling legislation which dedicated the area as a  “primitive 
wilderness.”  Notwithstanding the opposition, the legislation for the bridge passed and President 
                                                   
101 See also Lisa Heinzerling, Justice Breyer’s Hard Look, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 767, 770 
(1995). 
102 Binkley, Supra note 40, at 195 (“At first, the few [residents] with vehicles, and occasional 
visitors, did not relish the notion of beach-driving and did so simply because there were almost 
no roads on which to drive. After World War II, improved automotive technologies allowed 
more villagers and visitors to drive along the seashore, but without roads this activity still 
entailed the onerous rituals of re-inflating tires, digging out from occasional sandpits, and risking 
getting stuck.”). 
103 Id. at 190. 
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John F. Kennedy would sign the bill into law on October 11, 1962.104  The creational of the 
“Bonner Bridge,” along with the construction of a road, led to a surge in visitors.105  These 
improvements to infrastructure on CAHA were intended to better protect the environment by 
curtailing the necessity of beach driving, but it actually had the opposite effect.106  As discussed 
                                                   
104 Id. at 193; Act of October 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-799, 76 Stat. 909 (Herbert C. Bonner 
Papers (3710), National Seashore Files, Box 47, Folder 2232 (August-December 1962)).  
105 Binkley, Supra note 40, at 193-196 (“Upon completion, the bridge brought in waves of 
tourists whose numbers increased with each passing year, an indisputable and considerable 
economic benefit to all the villages on Hatteras and Ocracoke Islands. More immediately, there 
would no longer be frustrating wait times or dread by visitors over the possibility of being 
stranded on one side of the inlet if one were unlucky and missed the last scheduled ferry.”); see 
generally, Bonner Bridge Replacement Project, NCDOT, 
https://www.ncdot.gov/projects/bonnerbridgereplace/ [https://perma.cc/4PWH-ZKYG] (this 
bridge is called the “Bonner Bridge” and it is currently being replaced, which has produced 
several legal challenges by environmental groups); see generally Jeff Jeffrey, With lawsuits 
dropped, NCDOT prepares to replace Bonner Bridge, Triangle Business Journal (Aug. 18, 2015, 
5:23 pm) https://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/news/2015/08/18/ncdot-bonner-bridge-
replacement-plans.html [https://perma.cc/WAE8-ADSY]. 
106 Binkley, Supra note 40, at 196 (“[E]arly ramps . . . gave access to increasing numbers of 
tourists. Still, such uses did not begin to elicit great controversy until after the Bonner Bridge 
opened in 1964. With the bottleneck at Oregon Inlet removed, there was no limit to the number 
of park visitors who in a day’s span could drive down the banks and out onto the beach. 
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earlier, the land needed to establish CAHA was not acquired until 1953 and the initial focus of 
the park was not on ORV management, but on sand dune stabilization and beach erosion 
control.107  Managing and regulating CAHA got off to a very slow start, in large part due to a 
depletion of funding from a swell of hurricanes in 1955,108 and an expensive condemnation 
judgment.109  It was not until 1959 that regulation of the seashore began, when NPS submitted a 
final rule relating primarily to hunting and also establishing speed limits.110  Prompted by NEPA 
and the ORV Executive Orders almost two decades later, the NPS issued its first interim policy 
                                                   
Completion of the Bonner Bridge, therefore, marks a key demarcation point in the history of the 
first national seashore.”). 
107 Id. at 160 (these focuses were referred to as “Mission 66”). 
108 See Gordon E. Dunn & Walter R. Davis & Paul L. Moore, Hurricanes of 1955, Weather 
Bureau Office, Miami, Fla. (December 1955), 
http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/general/lib/lib1/nhclib/mwreviews/1955.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WAL-
VGKC].  
109 Binkley, Supra note 40, at 210 (“The largest single condemnation for Cape Hatteras National 
Seashore is heard in federal court. Unfortunately, the court awards $533,400 in the case of 
Winfield A. Worth, far more than NPS officials had anticipated, thus creating a financial 
crisis.”). 
110 Parks, Forests, and Memorials 36 Fed. Reg. 11001 (Dec. 30, 1959) (NPS rulemaking 
continued on the issues of hunting and fishing within CAHA, but no management policy was yet 
established for ORV access on the shoreline). 
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related to ORV use on CAHA, but the interim policy barely grappled with ORV use.111  Given 
the intense use of ORV’s on CAHA and the lack of any official rule or ORV management plan, 
three factions emerged that would be involved in ensuing litigation: numerous environmental. 
groups112; the Department of Interior113, and; ORV access groups, recreational groups, and 
business groups.114 
 1.  CHAPA I: The Piping Plover Shuts Down the Beach 
                                                   
111 Nat’l Park Serv., Statement for Management Cape Hatteras National Seashore (January 
1978), https://perma.cc/425B-D3V2 (“Vehicular use off paved roads is restricted to the ocean 
beach and to old sand roads used before park establishment . . . . The beach from Ramp 22 to the 
Loran State is closed to vehicles all year. Certain small areas of high beach on all three islands 
are closed to both vehicles and pedestrians in early summer to protect nesting terns, but visitors 
can pass seaward of such nesting sites.”). 
112 These environmental groups consisted of: Defenders of Wildlife; Center for Biological 
Diversity; Southern Appalachian Biodiversity Project; National Audubon Society; National 
Parks Conservancy Associations, and; Southern Environmental Law Center. 
113 Including the Fish and Wildlife Service and the NPS. 
114 Including “beach-buggy” organization formed to preserve free and open beach access, such as 
the Outer Banks Preservation Alliance, North Carolina Beach Buggy Association, Cape Hatteras 
Anglers Club, and the Cape Hatteras Access Preservation Alliance. 
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 The Piping Plover is a small, sand-colored, shorebird that is currently listed as 
endangered in the Great Lakes region and listed as threatened on the Atlantic coast.115  
“Wintering piping plovers” refers to the migration of plovers from areas like the Great Lakes to 
Atlantic areas like Cape Hatteras.116  Wintering plovers on CAHA have been listed as a 
threatened species under the ESA since 1985.117  In 2001, FWS designated 126 linear miles of 
the CAHA coast as critical habitat for the wintering piping plover population.118  Fourteen 
months following this designation, the Cape Hatteras Preservation Alliance (“CHAPA”), Dare 
and Hyde County and several business associations filed a lawsuit challenging the designation on 
several grounds, including: the FWS’s definition of the term “occupied” in the ESA as arbitrary 
and capricious; deficiencies in the FWS’s findings of primary constituent elements, and; failing 
to consider the economic impacts of the designation.119  The court granted summary judgment to 
CHAPA on several grounds, which successfully vacated the critical habitat designation for 
                                                   
115 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Piping Plover Fact Sheet (last updated Apr. 23, 2015), 
[https://perma.cc/23QM-ACQY]. 
116 Id. 
117 Determination of Endangered and Threatened Status for the Piping Plover, 50 Fed. Reg. 
50726 (Dec. 11, 1985). 
118 Cape Hatteras Access Pres. All. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 344 F.Supp.2d 108, 114 (D.D.C. 
2004). 
119 Id. at 119-127. 
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wintering plovers and re-opened the portions of the beach which had been closed-off.120 
Following the court’s order, the FWS began reevaluating the critical habitat designation and 
would eventually release a similar designation on June 12, 2006.121 
 2.  Defenders Go On the Offensive to Compel an ORV Management Plan  
 In 2007, the NPS had still not issued a long-term final ORV management rule, and was 
still relying on the interim strategy.  Unimpressed with the status quo, several environmental 
groups, including Defenders of Wildlife, Southern Environmental Law Center, and National 
Audubon Society filed suit on October 18, 2007, against the NPS, the Superintendent of CAHA 
and the Department of Interior.122  The case was resolved on April 16, 2008, pursuant to a 
consent decree that would serve, along with the interim plan, as the de facto ORV access and 
                                                   
120 Id. at 136 (the court granted summary judgment on the following grounds: FWS failed to 
comply with its statutory obligation to only designate as occupied critical habitat the areas where 
biological features of the wintering plovers were found and areas that “may require special 
management consideration or protection”; FWS failed to consider the economic impacts of 
designating critical habitat for the wintering plover; FWS failed to comply with NEPA). 
121 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, News Release (October 21, 2008), available at 
https://www.fws.gov/raleigh/pdfs/20081021_PIPLCH_fNewsRelease.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B7BQ-KZRC].  
122 Defenders of Wildlife v. Nat’l Park Serv., 2:07—CV—45—BO, 3-4 (E.D. N.C. 2008); see 
also Outer Banks Preservation Alliance, About Us (May 1, 2010) (CHAPA intervened in the 
lawsuit). 
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management plan.123  In addition, the Consent Decree required that the NPS complete an ORV 
Management Plan for CAHA by December 31, 2010, and enact a final rule by April 1, 2011.124  
Another focal point of the consent decree was establishing protected pre-nesting areas for 
wintering piping plovers and other shorebirds by establishing buffer zones, beach closures, and 
limiting driving at night to protect sea turtles, seabeach amaranth, and the plovers.125  The NPS 
retained enforcement authority and the ability to adopt more restrictive protective measures 
under the Consent Decree,126 which ORV access groups like CHAPA believed to be already 
overly-restrictive.127  
 In March 2011, the NPS notified the court and the parties of the consent decree that the 
final rule would not be completed by the original April 1, 2011, deadline establish by the consent 
                                                   
123 See id. at 3-4 (“Pending the implementation of the final Special Regulation . . . the Interim 
Strategy . . . shall remain in full force and effect, except as modified by the [Consent Decree].”). 
124 Id. at 3. 
125 Id. at 4-11. 
126 Id. at 15. 
127 See Outer Banks Preservation Alliance, OBPA History (May 1, 2010), 
http://obpa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=103&Itemid=100 
[https://perma.cc/7ZFK-3P7R] (“The consent decree forced more restrictive and unnecessary 
closures of the seashore beaches than previously outlined in the Interim . . . Plan. The effect was 
devastating. On July 9, 2009, 67% of the seashore beaches were closed to ORVs. Additionally, 
pedestrian access was denied to Cape Point and the inlet splits for the entire summer tourist 
season.”). 
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decree.128  The court modified the Consent Decree to extend the deadline, and finally the Cape 
Hatteras National Seashore ORV Management Plan and Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
was released to the public for comment on March 5, 2010.129 The final Management Plan and 
EIS was completed on December 20, 2010.130  
Under the NPS’s general regulations, ORV operation within areas of the National Park 
System is prohibited unless authorized by special regulation. The Management Plan required 
individuals who intended on accessing CAHA’s beach in their vehicles to obtain ORV permits, 
and to use only designated ORV routes which serve to limit ORV use within CAHA in a manner 
that protects and preserves natural and cultural resources, provides for a variety of safe visitor 
experiences, and minimizes conflicts among CAHA’s various users.131 
3. CHAPA II: Challenging FWS’s Revised Critical Habitat Designation 
Prior to the enactment of the final ORV Management Plan as compelled by the 2008 
consent decree, CHAPA again went on the offensive against FWS’s revised critical habitat 
designation.  CHAPA asserted that the revised critical habitat designation was simply a 
                                                   
128 Special Regulations, Areas of the National Park System, Cape Hatteras National Seashore—
Off-Road Vehicle Management, 77 Fed. Reg. 3123-01 (Jan. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 36 
C.F.R. pt. 7). 
129 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2016) (because the Management Plan was considered a 
major Federal action that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, NEPA 
demanded the NPS to perform an EIS). 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 3138. 
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repackaged version of the initial designation, and therefore was continuing to violate the remand 
order from the 2004 CHAPA I case.132  On February 6, 2009, CHAPA filed suit against the 
Department of Interior, and the Defenders of Wildlife and National Audubon Society 
intervened.133  
In an attempt to advocate for the less-restrictive interim ORV strategy, CHAPA moved to 
supplement FWS’s administrative record with a biological report which was used to develop the 
interim strategy.134 CHAPA’s strategy was to use the report to show that FWS did not consider 
all the relevant factors needed to make its decision to designate critical habitat and, as a result, 
                                                   
132 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-8, Cape Hatteras 
Access Pres. All., 667 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The Court’s 2004 opinion sets forth the 
background of the challenge to the 2001 critical habitat designation . . . The court granted 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, finding major violations of the ESA, NEPA, and the 
APA; vacated the critical habitat designation . . . and remanded the rule to the Service. On 
remand, the Service has essentially “repackaged” its proposed critical habitat for these four areas 
and failed to adequately address the serious violations of law found by the CHAPA I Court.”). 
133 Cape Hatteras Access Pres. All. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 731 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 
2010). 
134 Cape Hatteras Access Pres. All. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 667 F.  Supp.  2d 111, 112-113 
(D.D.C. 2009) (“At issue is whether this Court should consider a report that relates to the 
conservation of piping plovers . . . either because it was actually a part of the administrative 
record before the Service, though FWS did not designate it as such, or as extra-record evidence 
in the even the Court finds it was not a part of the administrative record. ” 
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obtain a vacatur of the designation like in CHAPA I.  Put more straightforward, CHAPA was 
simply attempting to preserve the interim ORV management status quo.  However, the court 
even confessed that the likelihood that CHAPA’s motion would conquer the strong presumption 
in favor of FWS would be a “rare bird.”135  As anticipated by the court, CHAPA did not 
overcome this presumption and the motion to supplement the administrative record was 
denied.136 
 Failing to vacate the rule on this procedural motion, CHAPA still had the underlying 
lawsuit to try and convince the court that the revised critical habitat designation should be 
vacated.  Unlike CHAPA I, the court found that FWS had fulfilled its statutory duties under the 
ESA and NEPA, and the court ultimately concluded that the revised critical habitat designation 
was legally sufficient and had evaluated all necessary considerations.137  This was certainly a 
setback for CHAPA and recreationists, but the fight was continuing behind the scenes of this 
litigation, where the negotiations for the long-term ORV Management Plan and a draft EIS were 
being conducted. 
                                                   
135 Id. at 112. 
136 Id. at 116. 
137 Cape Hatteras Pres. All. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 731 F. Supp. 2d 15, 36 (D.D.C. 2010) (“the 
Service properly designated and evaluated the special management considerations for each 
primary constituent element as required by the EA. Further, the Service properly considered 
economic and other impacts as required by the ESA. Finally, after taking a “hard look” at the 
potential environmental consequences, the Service correctly determined that an EIS was not 
required pursuant to NEPA.”), 
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4. CHAPA III: The Final ORV Management Plan Gets Hauled into Court 
 On January 23, 2012, CAHA finally had issued a final, long-term ORV Management 
Plan.138  It did not take long for CHAPA to respond; on February 9, 2012, CHAPA filed suit 
against the NPS and the Superintendent of CAHA seeking a declaratory judgment that the ORV 
Management Plan violated NEPA, the Organic Act of 1916, CAHA enabling legislation, and the 
APA.139  Furthermore, CHAPA sought to enjoin the implementation of the ORV Management 
Plan.140 
 CHAPA’s first argument contested the ORV Management Plan’s conformity with 
CAHA’s enabling legislation and the Organic Act, asserting that the enabling legislation 
expressly “sought to preserve public access . . . and use of CAHA for recreational purposes [by] . 
. . requir[ing] that certain lands and waters on the Outer Banks of North Carolina be ‘established, 
dedicated, and set apart as a national seashore recreation area for the benefit and enjoyment of 
                                                   
138 Special Regulations, Areas of the National Park System, Cape Hatteras National Seashore—
Off-Road Vehicle Management, 77 Fed. Reg. 3123-01 (Jan. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 36 
C.F.R. pt. 7) (“This rule designates [ORV] routes and authorizes limited ORV use within 
[CAHA] in a manner that will protect and preserve natural and cultural resources, provide a 
variety of safe visitor experiences, and minimize conflicts among various users.”). 
139 Cape Hatteras Pres. All. v. Jewell, 28 F.Supp.3d 537, 544-551 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (Defenders of 
Wildlife, National Audubon Society, and National Parks Conservancy Association intervened in 
the lawsuit). 
140 Id. at 539. 
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the people.’”141  Additionally, CHAPA argued that although the enabling legislation does not 
mention ORV use, it did draw a distinction between two types of land: one specially adaptable 
for recreation, and the other as a primitive wilderness.142  The court, however, did not find that 
these assertions prevailed over the broad discretion the NPS maintains in implementing the 
mandatory ORV Management Plan.143  Similar to CLF’s ORV challenge on Cape Cod National 
Seashore, the court here proclaimed that conservation was the predominant facet of the 
legislation, not enjoyment and recreation.144 
 The remaining arguments rested on a general theory that the development of the EIS and 
the subsequent ORV Management Plan had violated NEPA, the ESA and the APA.145  As a 
starting point, the EIS that was developed in conjunction with the ORV Management Plan 
                                                   
141 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Cape Hatteras Access 
Preservation Alliance’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, 9, Cape Hatteras Access Pres. All. 
v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d 537 (E.D.N.C. 2014)(NO. 2:13-CV-1-BO) (emphasis omitted) (citing 
16 U.S.C. § 459). 
142  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Cape Hatteras Access 
Preservation Alliance’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6, Cape Hatteras Access Pres. All. 
v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d 537 (E.D.N.C. 2014)(NO. 2:13-CV-1-BO) 
143 Cape Hatteras Pres. All. v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 545 (“[E]ntering judgment in favor of 
CHAPA on its Enabling Act claim would require the Court to override the broad discretion 
enjoyed by the NPS to implement its mandate to provide for an ORV management plan on the 
Seashore, which the Court finds no basis . . . to do . . . .”).  
144 Id. 
145 See Cape Hatteras Pres. All. v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 545-552. 
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included six action alternatives: (1) “Alternative A – No Action: Continuation of Management 
under the Interim Protected Species Management Strategy”; (2) “Alternative B – No Action: 
Continuation of Terms of the Consent Decree Signed April 30, 2008, and amended June 4, 
2009”; (3) “Alternative C – Seasonal Management”; (4) “Alternative D – Increased 
Predictability and Simplified Management”; (5) Alternative E – Variable Access and Maximum 
Management”, and; (6) “Alternative F, the NPS preferred alternative” which was selected as the 
action to be implemented.146  With regard to the two “no action” alternatives, the first of which 
CHAPA had advocated for before in CHAPA I & II, the group argued that those alternatives 
were not “true no action alternatives” because a true no action alternative would have been no 
restrictions whatsoever on ORV use, and therefore NPS had failed to identify and assess a true 
no action alternative.147  The court held that CHAPA had failed to demonstrate that the use of the 
                                                   
146 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, RECORD OF DECISION: CAPE 
HATTERAS NATIONAL SEASHORE OFF-ROAD VEHICLE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT at 8, 9, 11,15 (2010); Final Environmental Impact 
Statement and Cape Hatteras National Seashore Off-Road Vehicle Management Plan, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 219 (Nov. 15, 2010). 
147 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Cape Hatteras Access 
Preservation Alliance’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Cape Hatteras Access Pres. All. v. 
Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d 537 (E.D.N.C. 2014)(NO. 2:13-CV-1-BO) (“The FEIS’s choice of two no 
action alternatives that are not true no action alternatives and that already reflect movement 
toward the proposed action had the effect of impeding meaningful analysis and public comment, 
as well as obfuscating and grossly understating the impacts of the Final Plan and the other action 
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two no action alternatives was arbitrary and capricious; reasoning that the management plan at 
the time the NPS was performing the EIS was the consent decree (Alternative B) which “served 
as the appropriate baseline for comparison purposes.”148  The decision to attack the use of the no 
action alternatives is in-line with CHAPA’s “free and open access” mission statement because, 
although they are called “no action alternatives,” those alternatives consider an ORV baseline 
that represents a regulated ORV access plan.  What CHAPA was after was for the NPS, public 
commenters, and the EIS to consider and analyze, as the baseline alternative, an ORV access 
regime that would be unregulated, as it was before the interim strategy began in 1978. This 
theory, however, runs afoul a swell of case law standing for the proposition that it is not 
improper to examine no action alternatives that represent the “status quo” as the baseline.149  As 
                                                   
alternatives on recreational, cultural, historic, and socioeconomic values and resources. NPS’s 
failure to identify and assess a true no action alternative in the FEIS is contrary to NEPA . . . 
regulations, and is arbitrary and capricious under the APA.”). 
148 Cape Hatteras Pres. All. v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 547-548 (also adding that “[t]he interim 
strategy was the status quo immediately prior to the implementation of the consent decree in 
2008, and thus was a reasonable additional no action alternative as it represented the period of 
time just before the implementation of the consent decree.”).  
149 E.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 623 F.3d 633, 642 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that under NEPA, “no action alternative[s] in an EIS allow [] policymakers and the 
public to compare the environmental consequences of the status quo to the consequences of the 
proposed action, . . . [and] is meant to provide a baseline against which the action alternative . . . 
is evaluated”); Custer Cty. Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1040 (10th Cir. 2001) 
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the court put it: “Though CHAPA has demonstrated that it is dissatisfied with NPS’s no 
alternative selections, it has simply failed to demonstrate that such selections were arbitrary and 
capricious.”150 
 Next, CHAPA contends that the NPS failed to properly evaluate all of the significant 
social and economic effects of the ORV Management Plan.151  Specifically, CHAPA argued that 
because the NPS expanded the geographic area of the analysis to include larger towns that have 
little-to-no connection with ORV access and use, the NPS had masked the true and direct social 
and economic impacts of the plan on the local communities that would be most affected by the 
plan.152  This argument is compelling because the assessment of the social and economic impacts 
on locations within the Outer Banks, but outside the scope of CAHA, may have distorted the 
actual impacts of CAHA’s distinct economy.  CAHA is more driven by recreational activities, 
such as ORV use, and less on an industry-based tourism economy, like in the northern areas of 
the Outer Banks.  Nonetheless, the secondary nature of socioeconomic impacts under NEPA, the 
court’s finding that the NPS had taken the appropriate “hard-look,” and the finding that the 
                                                   
(“Council on Environmental Quality intended that agencies compare the potential impacts of the 
proposed . . . action to the known impacts of maintaining the status quo . . . .”). See also Mont. 
Wilderness Ass’n v. McAllister, 460 Fed. App’x. 667, 671 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding the use of 
two no action alternatives); Kilroy v. Ruckelshaus, 738 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). 
150 Cape Hatteras Pres. All. v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 548. 
151 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Cape Hatteras Access 
Preservation Alliance’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 18-19, Cape Hatteras Access Pres. 
All. v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d 537 (E.D.N.C. 2014)(NO. 2:13-CV-1-BO). 
152 Id. 
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broadening of the scope of the assessment did not obfuscate the data moved the court to hold that 
NPS’s conclusions were not arbitrary and capricious.153  
 The next claim related to the EIS and ORV Management Plan’s adoption of buffer 
distances to minimize the impact of human disturbance on nesting birds and chicks, among other 
species like sea turtles.154 CHAPA’s primary contention on this claim was that the NPS did not 
consider a reasonable range of buffer distances and instead used bias in favor of species 
protection over ORV use.155  This was true, but not unlawful; the court discussed CAHA’s 
enabling legislation which mandates that the NPS “implement no ‘project or plan for the 
convenience of visitors . . . which would be incompatible with the preservation of the unique 
flora and fauna or the physiographic conditions’ of the Seashore.”156  Thus, the NPS had acted 
reasonably in its consideration and execution of buffer distances and closures. 
 Lastly, CHAPA contended that the EIS was unsupported by sound scientific evidence 
and consequently did not satisfy the requirements of NEPA.  More specifically, CHAPA argued 
that the NPS used inadequate scientific data when focusing on buffer zones created for the 
protection and preservation of wildlife.157  The court contemplated that CHAPA’s “challenge to 
the underlying science of the FEIS appea[red] to be a veiled attempt to argue that recreational 
interests, specifically ORV interests, should have been assigned more weight in NPS’s 
                                                   
153 Cape Hatteras Pres. All. v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 548-549. 
154 Id. at 550; see also Cape Hatteras Access Pres. All., 731 F. Supp. 2d at 19. 
155 Cape Hatteras Pres. All. v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 550. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 551. 
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analysis.”158 Further, the court concluded that the NPS’s decision and ORV Management Plan 
was “based on sound scientific data and that NEPA’s hard look requirement had been 
satisfied."159 
 In sum, the court closed the door on CHAPA’s attempt to strike down the ORV 
Management Plan, which called for more restrictions to ORV access on CAHA.160 The decision 
not only had critical impacts on ORV access on CAHA, but it also endorses the proposition that 
the NPS Organic Act and CAHA’s enabling legislation favors the concerns of conservation and 
preservation, not enjoyment and recreation. 
                                                   
158 Id. 
159 Id. (relying primarily on: (1) the fact that CHAPA had failed to identify any study or data 
which contradicted or would invalidate the NPS’s conclusions; (2) deference afforded to 
agencies in evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise, and; (3) support by FWS, 
stating that the buffer distances represented their current understanding of the biological needs of 
the wintering piping plover and other at-risk species).  
160 Id. at 552 (“At bottom, CHAPA asks this Court to flyspeck NPS’s environmental analysis in 
order to identify any minor deficiency to propound a basis to reject the final rule, which the 
Court will not and cannot do. A holistic analysis of the process reveals that NPS engaged in a 
careful and detailed study of the Seashore, its wildlife and vegetation, and the visitors and 
residents who utilize the beaches to arrive at a plan which is based on the factors that Congress 
intended to be considered and was not preordained or a fait accompli . . . . It is clear from the 
record in this matter that NPS sufficiently considered all viewpoints when determining how to 
regulate ORV use on the Seashore . . . .”). 
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v.  CONCLUSION 
 Although the NPS Organic Act’s two-pronged purpose can function as a contradiction, 
various courts and the NPS have consistently interpreted the Organic Act as favoring 
preservation and conservation over recreation and enjoyment.  This notion is sure to be 
frustrating to those “beach-buggy” associations and the like who favor minimally restricted or 
non-existent ORV regulation.  However, it is important for recreationists not to take away from 
this interpretation that ORV access should be, or will be, banned in the future.  One reason for 
this is because the interpretation of the NPS Organic Act in the context of ORV use have only 
been litigated in national seashores where the enabling legislation text plainly favors the interests 
of preservation, and only carves out an exception for uses relating to recreation and enjoyment.  
Therefore, the takeaway should not be that ORV access will always be secondary, nor should it 
be that an outright ban is impending.  Rather, the takeaway should be that a one-size-fits-all 
approach to ORV access on all of our country’s national seashores is not a feasible strategy, 
either legally or in public policy.   
An outright ban on ORV access would not make sense in the case of a national seashore 
such as Padre Island or Assateague Island, where the enabling legislation promotes recreation, 
not as an exception, but as the general rule.  Arguably, neither would an outright ban be feasible 
in a national seashore like CAHA, where ORV use is deeply imbedded in the cultural, 
recreational, historic, and economic constitution of the area.  Such an approach would arguably 
supersede the purposes of the NPS Organic Act and CAHA’s enabling legislation.  The corollary 
to an outright ban: a “free and open access” policy, where there is absolutely no protection for 
the ecology and environment, would be improper for the same reasons as an outright ban, and 
because of the function of environmental legislation like NEPA and ESA. 
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Every national seashore is different: from their ecological composition, to the ways in 
which the seashore was and is used and enjoyed.  This is exactly why each national seashore has 
different enabling legislation and different regulatory frameworks.  As a result, each national 
seashore should be regulated commensurate with its distinct characteristics and its distinct legal 
frameworks.  This is precisely the reason why the NPS is furnished with such great discretion; so 
that it can draw lines in the sand after determining which parts of the seashore have the capacity 
for ORV use, and which parts do not.161  This position is consistent with Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence in Clark, and it is consistent with the two-pronged purpose of the NPS.  What 
remains to be seen is whether the inclination toward preservation and conservation will persist in 
the upcoming years, or instead, if there will be a recreationally friendly policy change in how the 
NPS exercises their vast discretion on the issue of ORV access on national seashores. 
                                                   
161 For a visual on what this looks like, see House Committee on Natural Resources, Press 
Release, https://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedphotos/highresolution/d5804cb3-0849-
4c08-993b-db6f63961a03.jpg [https://perma.cc/UWY4-4SU5]. 
